Repligen-Shareholder Proxy Access

Resolved: Shareholders of Repligen Inc (“Company”) request that our board of directors take the steps necessary to enable as many shareholders as may be needed to aggregate their shares to equal 3% of our stock owned continuously for 3-years in order to enable shareholder proxy access with the following provisions:

Nominating shareholders and groups must have owned at least 3% of the outstanding shares of common stock of the Company continuously for a period of at least 3-years. Such shareholders shall be entitled to nominate a total of up to 25% of the number of authorized directors. 

Supporting Statement: Proxy access for shareholders enables shareholders to put competing director candidates on the company ballot to see if they can get more votes than some of management’s director candidates. A competitive election is good for everyone. This proposal can help ensure that our management will nominate directors with outstanding qualifications in order to avoid giving shareholders a reason to exercise their right to use proxy access.

Under this proposal it is likely that the number of shareholders who participate in the aggregation process would still be a modest number due to the administrative burden on shareholders to qualify as one of the aggregation participants. Plus, it is easy for management to reject potential aggregating shareholders because the administrative burden on shareholders leads to a number of potential technical errors by shareholders that management can readily detect.

Proxy Access in the United States: Revisiting the Proposed SEC Rule ( a cost-benefit analysis by CFA Institute, found proxy access would “benefit both the markets and corporate boardrooms, with little cost or disruption,” raising US market capitalization by up to $140.3 billion. Public Versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access ( found a 0.5 percent average increase in shareholder value for proxy access targeted firms. Proxy access has been adopted by 580 major companies, including 75% of the S&P 500, since 2015. Adoption of this proposal will make our Company more competitive in its corporate governance.

This proposal should be seen in the context shareholders at our Company have no right to call a special meeting or right to act by written consent.